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Abstract
This article was finalized shortly after the UK refe-
rendum announcing a Brexit and the European 
Council receiving a new European Union Global 
Strategy for foreign and security policy. Momen-
tous times when “business as usual” hardly is an 
option inside EU institutions. The approach to the 
topic is broader than the topical issue of com-
prehensiveness in conflicts and crises. An effort is 
also made to take into account the actual working 
conditions of EU staff at headquarters in Brussels 
and in the field. The author argues that key messa-
ges to staff to apply a bold and ambitious com-
prehensive approach, will now be necessary and 
the academic and think-tank community needs to 
be helpful to this end.
Resumo
A Abordagem Abrangente e a Ação Externa da 
União Europeia: Perspetiva de um Representante 
Nacional na UE
O presente artigo foi concluído pouco depois do referendo 
no Reino Unido e do Conselho Europeu ter acolhido uma 
nova Estratégia Global da União Europeia para a 
Política Externa e de Segurança. A abordagem adotada 
nesta análise posiciona-se para além dos limites da 
abordagem abrangente aos conflitos e crises. Neste sen-
tido dar-se-á atenção às condições funcionais presentes 
nos quarteis generais da União, em Bruxelas e no ter-
reno. O autor debate a necessidade dos funcionários 
europeus adotarem uma abordagem abrangente, corajosa 
e ambiciosa, reconhecendo-a como um requisito, devendo 
igualmente as comunidades académicas e de analistas 
pertencentes a think-tanks corresponderem a este impor-
tante desafio.
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Background
The paper is a spin-off effect from the interviews that the author carried out in the 
EU institutions in preparation for a handbook on EU and security published in 2015 
(Lundin, 2015). Scores of group discussions have fed into the analysis with: actual 
or prospective EU officials working as CSDP leaders, heads of political sections in 
EU delegations, desk officers in one of the external relation DGs of the European 
Commission, Member State Ambassadors posted to a key multilateral organization 
and local agents doing political reporting on behalf of an EU delegation. Above 
all, it is of course influenced by the author's experience as an EU official from 
1996-2011. 
The essay refers to many categories of staff. It includes administrators deployed to 
headquarters and to delegations, who in their work primarily apply a geographic 
perspective to external action policies, with just a few also working on the multilat-
eral level. It includes a limited number of desk officers at headquarters focusing on 
thematic issues such as human rights and the rule of law. It includes the entire arm 
of EEAS, the European External Action Service that is in charge of CSDP, the 
common security and defense policy, including civil-military missions and explicit 
security policies, such as counter-terrorism and conflict prevention. It notably also 
includes staff in several other structures in charge of implementation of external 
action policies based on the community method, including the Service for Foreign 
Policy Instruments (FPI), the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlarge-
ment Negotiations (NEAR), the Directorate-General for International Cooperation 
and Development 
(DEVCO), to name a few of the most relevant DGs in the Commission – there are 
others, such as those dealing with trade, maritime, energy, environment, cyber and 
other thematic policies of relevance to security. It is important to note that in many 
security contexts, just to take one example – trafficking and migrant smuggling – 
the principal interlocutors from the EU structures work in internal DGs in the Com-
mission.
Wishful thinking regarding further short-term reforms or new resources is left 
aside. Instead, the focus is on low hanging fruits both for the hierarchy and for staff 
itself. How can the responsible units produce more, sometimes with less staff? 
Officials Face Increasingly Difficult Challenges
The current situation facing EU structures as regards security contains a paradox. 
The general public in Europe, strongly influenced by populist tendencies, often 
blames the EU for not having done enough to counter serious security-related 
problems, notably irregular migration. 
At the same time, there are many arguments put forward to the effect that the EU 
should not do more but rather less in the future. 
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As regards hard security, skeptics point to a more important role of NATO, not least 
given the NATO Summit in July 2016 in Poland. As regards border security many 
advocate more focus on national frontiers. As regards Ukraine, many see the leading 
role not to be on the level of the EU but belonging to a few important Member States. 
And the determination to ask the EU to take a leading role in the Middle East is 
simply not there. The High Representative (also Vice President of the Commission, 
HR/VP) after some years of hesitation was asked to put forward a European global 
strategy to the European Council in June 2016. This strategy may, however, become 
even harder to implement than the initial perceptions about the conditions for 
implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy. In 2003 the number of issues 
on the table was much smaller. And the European Union counted on the possibility 
to work in close collaboration with at least two strategic partners, the United States 
and Russia. Now the relationship to Russia is defined as a strategic challenge rather 
than as a partnership (HR/VP, 2016) and the ability of whoever is elected President 
of the United States, for instance, to get a trade agreement with Europe ratified is 
very much in doubt. And what is more: the two remaining American presidential 
candidates agree on the absolute requirement of Europe taking more of the burden 
concerning defense and security in and around Europe. 
In a rational world, this would lead to serious preoccupations in Europe about how 
to mobilize the necessary political will to deal with the security challenges ahead. 
In a real world political leaders seem to focus more on to what extent they will be 
able to maintain power on the national level. And they will need to take into account 
very much increasing skepticism of their constituencies about the role of the EU.
On the level of the top hierarchy of the EU structures in the real world, the central 
preoccupation may in this situation be how to do damage limitation concerning 
maintaining essential solidarity between the EU Member States in implementing 
already agreed decisions – for instance on how to share the migration challenge. 
As noted by European Council President Donald Tusk on Twitter in April 2016: 
“Solving the root causes of migration cannot be ignored but too often sounded like 
an alibi for doing nothing in Europe.”
The Natural Reaction when Faced with Difficulties: Look Down
The posture of the EU official in such a situation may lead to even less attention to 
the need for a comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises than before. 
The fatigue when it comes to speaking in a language of grand strategy may be over-
whelming unless efforts to beef up morale are deployed by the top hierarchy and 
by supporting efforts from the outside.
The EU official is in any case faced with substantial difficulties from his or her per-
sonal perspective when it comes to security. Especially as regards officials with a 
background in the Commission, he/she has typically not been recruited to the EU 
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on qualifications relating to security in a broader sense. In many cases, particularly 
as regards temporary agents recruited from the Member States, he/she may not be 
very familiar with what the EU actually can do on security at large; without a sig-
nificant experience of working with the EU, the structures in Brussels may be per-
ceived as black boxes. For example, it took some time before the military experts in 
the EU came to the view that it was important to cooperate with the Commission 
on something more than the financing of small civilian projects in the field. 
It was only in a few specific contexts that a large number of EU officials dealing 
with security problems from different perspectives came to the understanding that 
wider coordination is a necessary condition for success. The most cited case in point 
may be the Horn of Africa and piracy. But in that context, it also soon became 
apparent that to develop real coordination on maritime security a lot of actors need 
to work together. It would take time, and it would be difficult to determine who has 
brought the most significant contribution to the table. In the case of maritime secu-
rity, which was a cross-sectoral policy product together with the European Com-
mission more than 300 stakeholders were involved including major international 
players such as the United States, Russia, India, and China (Lundin, 2015). Not least 
the importance of private sector contributions became more than obvious.
It goes without saying that no individual EU official will be able or advised to push 
for such a level of coordination in an area without substantial support from the 
hierarchy. The hierarchy cannot give such support without being very selective 
when implementing the European global strategy. It also, goes without saying that 
the HR/VP is not likely to make such recommendations unless there is intense 
political pressure from Member States and unless there is substantial evidence 
through reporting from the field that such an ambitious approach makes sense.
The EU Mobilizes in Crisis: the Need for Three Compelling Messages from the 
HR/VP to Staff
The golden opportunity for the EU official to make a difference through advocating 
an early, bold and ambitious, comprehensive approach comes before and during a 
crisis. Wishful thinking would have it that crisis would be prevented through early 
action as proposed in the EU global strategy. For that to happen there are, however, 
at least three important messages that the EU hierarchy needs to send to staff. 
First, that people need to think ahead and look widely seeking to enhance situa-
tional awareness. An essential element in staff evaluations should, therefore, be 
willingness and ability to discuss lessons learned and appreciate the importance of 
the work of others inside and outside the EU. Unique focus on EU visibility and the 
implementation of the project in which the EU official may be engaged in, should 
not be sufficient. Each EU official needs to adopt a learning attitude, not only 
through engaging in training – the budget for training, particularly, in EU delega-
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tions is very limited. Each EU official needs to be enabled by his/her hierarchy to 
use resources on the Internet to familiarize him or herself with the link between 
what he/she is doing and what others are doing. Only through such an effort can 
the potential of wider coordination be identified. And only through such knowl-
edge can the proper role of the EU, often as a catalyst in very complex environ-
ments, be proposed. Routine reporting to the head of delegation, weekly or monthly 
reports to headquarters may be useful, but the proof of their effectiveness will be 
the content and the extent to which important messages are received vertically and 
horizontally in the organization, including in communication with Member States. 
For this to happen a lot of work will need to be deployed on wider analysis which 
may not need to be sent immediately but rather form the basis for contingency 
planning. Thinking ahead also needs to include contingency planning as regards 
crisis coordination. A looming crisis initially may be perceived to signal failure, and 
it’s only natural that whoever feels in charge of the policy relating to the crisis will 
try to do whatever can be done to prevent it from escalating him or herself. Sharing 
responsibility with others is not an easy decision. Early contingency planning in 
this regard can help to win back time otherwise lost in establishing effective coordi-
nation including both crisis management expertise and other relevant services. The 
rivalry in the past concerning who should be in the lead in emergency coordination 
should be possible to overcome.
Secondly, the hierarchy will need to take some responsibility for the risks that secu-
rity work entails for individual officials and express confidence in their ability to do 
multitasking. The current predominant focus in EU training is on how to respect 
information security regulations and how to promote sound financial management 
(EEAS Human Resources Report, 2015). Both these types of training focus on what 
not to do. But the HR/VP has to stress that she and many other leaders in the EU 
structures need to know. Otherwise, the risk is that essential knowledge never is 
communicated, that non-action is deemed a safer alternative in a difficult security 
situation, which also could include potential threats to an official. More widely, it is 
also important for the top hierarchy to express general confidence in the ability of 
staff to act on behalf of the EU. It is important to counteract the tendency to focus 
on the HR/VP alone beyond setting up of a cluster of Commissioners in support of 
EU external action. The role of EU Special Representatives, EU heads of delegations 
and many other actors who can help to communicate and coordinate must be 
upgraded, including by entrusting important functions to Member State represen-
tatives. In this sense, this essay concurs with the recommendation made by Sir 
Robert Cooper in a recent publication stressing the importance of individual EU 
ambassadors and of better cooperation with the Commission (Cooper, 2016). For 
him, as well, the issue of implementation of the European Union global strategy is 
now to a large extent a question of organization. Regarding external communica-
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tion increasing emphasis thus needs to be put on the uniformity of the message that 
the EU sends, not on who delivers it.
Third, the hierarchy, not least in the Commission, will need to stress even more 
firmly that project budgets, are to be seen as a raw material that needs refining as 
any other raw material in modern society. The prevailing trend over more than a 
decade to package assistance in substantial portfolios, sometimes being delivered 
to a partner government in the form of budgetary support, needs to be reviewed. 
The fact that the international community pays for at least two-thirds of the national 
budget of Afghanistan (Craig, 2014) does not in itself cater for success. In many 
security-related areas, it is just impossible to achieve the desired impact without 
working with the money. The area of the rule of law, including human rights, is a 
serious case in point where simplistic notions of conditionality often don’t work. 
Clearly, this puts the requirement on a political ex-ante evaluation of proposed 
projects much higher than has been the case in some security-related areas over the 
last years. Especially in the intergovernmental sphere, the hesitation to do a serious 
analysis of impact and feasibility before taking decisions has been unyielding. The 
responsibility for dealing with resource problems, including how to cope with 
shortages regarding staffing, has often been pushed down to the level of heads of 
delegation and directors. The EU needs to undertake serious reviews of the imple-
mentation of policies more often. 
The Potential Negative Power of an EU Official Should not be Underestimated
The author, after significant interaction with EU officials over the last years, 
following on to his background in the EU, assumes the following: the main instinct 
of the typical official will in a period of uncertainty be to play it safe, first of all 
respecting the rules and procedures of the organization. Security policy is, how-
ever, an area, which requires initiative and calculated risk-taking. It is not enough 
just doing what you are told. It means to favor action over non-action. Here it is 
important to note that the negative power of many officials in the system is signifi-
cant. The hierarchy may promise things to be done, for instance by committing 
funds to implement projects, missions or operations. But there will be scores of 
officials needed to implement these instructions swiftly. If they play it safe, imple-
mentation will be significantly delayed or not taking place at all. As regards the 
realization of the European Union global strategy, playing it safe will mean waiting 
for not only general but also operational and precise instructions – putting it to the 
hierarchy to take the risks.
Security policy in the EU is only slowly becoming explicit and comprehensive – 
and internal security has come first.
The history of EU involvement in security is not very encouraging, although sig-
nificant steps forward have been taken in the last decades. For a very long time, the 
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notion of the EU as a peace project was not explicitly endorsed in the EU’s treaties. 
Integration and its role for peace were seen as an implicit goal unto the end of the 
90s. When the European Security and Defense Policy was set up after British – 
French agreement at the bilateral summit in Saint Malo in 1998 (Lundin, 2015), the 
focus was not on what the EU could do as whole for security. Rather a dedicated 
service was set up in the Council Secretariat governed by consensus rules and 
financed through a minuscule budget. The entire EU budget, which is handled by 
the European Commission, was not explicitly to be used for these purposes. The 
European Commission as a consequence did not widely use concepts such as secu-
rity policy or crisis management until a few years later, after 9/11 (Lundin, 2015). 
This practice turned out to be untenable when the West and the world faced terror-
ist threats requiring a considerable upgrade of internal as well as external security 
structures in the EU.
Leaders could no longer afford to be passive regarding the need for a comprehen-
sive approach. The first major example was indeed 9/11 when the EU structures 
were required to search for every possible contribution to a comprehensive action 
plan, stretching existing competencies to the limit. For the first time, the United 
States not only looked for European burden sharing in defense but also looked for 
harmonized European systems governing internal security. Significant efforts were 
deployed to deal with the situation even before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force 
at the end of 2009. What had been an embryo of internal security services before 
9/11 grew into several directorate generals. And security approaches to some 
community policy areas turned into significant thematic initiatives in many sectors 
ranging from cyber, energy, climate change, migration, organized crime and 
counterterrorism, et cetera. The internal security strategy first adopted in 2010 enu-
merated a finite number of priorities and set out operational implementation plans 
in particular areas. Further steps were taken in this direction in 2015, particularly as 
regards irregular migration.
Comparatively Modest Ambitions on the External Side
But on the external side goals remained much more modest. The first HR of British 
nationality, also acting as VP of the Commission after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon treaty, graciously accepted a role as defined by Member States: the entire 
EEAS was to be set up not as a change management project with strategic ambitions 
regarding resources and organization. No, in her own words, it was to be an aircraft 
to be assembled in flight, while implementing a consistent reduction of staff with 
1% for each budget year. One-third of the administrators was to be recruited from 
Member States. And available resources in the system coming from the European 
Commission and the Council Secretariat had to be distributed thinly across the 
world. Fewer than 1000 administrators (EEAS Human Resources report, 2015) had 
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to be spread across more than 130 delegations as well as across the entire service at 
headquarters level. The main ambition to have at least a few administrators also in 
the smaller EU delegations led to the need to reduce some strategic capabilities 
existing before the entry into force of the treaty: significantly by abolishing the 
significant planning unit serving Javier Solana in the Council Secretariat. EEAS also 
attempted to reduce support staff to EU Special Representatives. The need to give 
attention to the main thematic challenges with the Commission could not be given 
priority. For instance, when cyber security developed into a policy of importance 
initially only one single national expert in the EEAS could be deployed to work on 
this topic.
The Need for a Helicopter Perspective in External Action 
 When looking for success in external action of relevance to security it has for 
more than a decade been obvious that one needs to focus on the end state after 
major operations and projects. When so doing the issue is less one of successful 
project implementation or the safe return to the base of a military unit. The issue 
is more about the net EU impact on the situation, as a catalyst for change in an 
enormously complex situation on all levels. What for a long time made decision-
makers in the EU hesitate about the usefulness of an EU global strategy was of 
course precisely this complexity and constant change also on the strategic level. 
What is more, experiences before and after the Arab Spring also illustrates the 
need to look back to lessons learned. And every local situation needs to be put 
into a wider regional perspective. Effective implementation requires coalition 
building, which means identifying other relevant actors in every situation. In the 
end, a helicopter perspective needs to be developed when pursuing security-
related endeavors. 
Comprehensiveness as a policy and as a method (in French ‘approache globale’) is a 
natural part of the effort to promote effective leadership by zooming out and 
develop a strategic overview of what needs to be taken into account when imple-
menting a strategy or policy. This insight has been growing gradually over several 
decades inside and outside the EU. Thus there was an explicit reference to the 
need for a comprehensive approach by the American administration (i.e. Richard 
Armitage) when referring to a lack of effectiveness in Korea policy towards the end 
of the 90s. The need for a comprehensive concept of security including human 
rights and democracy was a standard feature of the EU approach to the OSCE par-
ticularly after the Cold War, which means seeing the comprehensive approach as a 
policy. Conflict prevention mainstreaming was set out as a goal for all external 
policies by the European Commission in 2001 and can be seen as a comprehensive 
approach in terms of method. In the absence of agreement on the proposal to 
develop a global strategy for the EU much effort was put into the comprehensive 
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approach to external action in the years leading up to a communication from 2013 
followed by an action plan for 2015, selecting some geographical cases. The new 
Neighbourhood Policy was not included in the action plan. Instead, a case-by-case 
approach was developed with an emphasis on countries outside the neighborhood. 
To some extent, the notion of a comprehensive approach is also related to the dis-
course on the coherence of EU external policies. This requirement, which has been 
an element in EU treaties before Lisbon, was, of course, a central part of the nego-
tiations ahead of the Treaty, which entered into force in 2009. The notion that the EU 
punched below its weight was a standard argument in this context given the fact 
that many see the EU mainly as an economic power.
Who Can Help and What Can the Official do for Him/Herself?
So one would have thought that resources should be put at the disposal of the 
EEAS to be able to develop sufficient training programs to enable people to under-
stand how others work. The global strategy will be helpful, of course, in this 
regard but more targeted efforts will be necessary. Budgetary constraints lead to 
pessimism about what realistically the system can produce in the form of training 
programs. 
To deploy personnel without training is of course anathema in CSDP. The European 
Security and Defense College is essential, and exercises are important. CSDP staff 
needs sufficient training.
Not much of this can be said for staff training in other areas. European Union 
Member States typically recruit diplomats as future generalists. And there are 
many other specialist personnel categories in the Commission and the EEAS that 
have received no more general security training, beyond the understanding of 
more formal security regulations governing the security of information and infra-
structure.
In the EEAS there is training for instance for heads of political sections in EU dele-
gations in order, not least, to improve political reporting. But this is only the begin-
ning. The proof of the pudding will be to see the comprehensive approach perspec-
tive applied in concrete cases. 
The Role of Think-tanks and the Academic Community 
For the literature produced by think-tanks and others to be useful, it needs to be 
presented to the expert readers in the correct way. 
Experts, particularly in the field, but also desks at headquarters are not likely to 
take advice seriously if they detect a lack of understanding of the real difficulties to 
work in the field. The way experts perceive the messages coming from the think-
tank community is fundamental for the impact these messages are going to have. 
Doing evaluations of field work is easier said than done. The risk is that the intended 
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readership approaches the evaluation from a damage limitation perspective: how 
can I influence the evaluator to give a more positive image of my work?
So it may be that more or less the same study with the same recommendations in 
substance may be received very differently by the intended readership; whether 
there is respect for the difficulties of working in the field or not. It is also fundamen-
tal if that the person bringing the message is seen as representing a special interest; 
be it regarding more money to be allocated to a specific sector or for that matter 
more resources to be assigned to a particular type of research.
As a former practitioner in EU structures and on the level of a Member State, it is 
also important to note that objections to the validity of the recommendations of a 
particular case study often may be very practical and close to the personal situation 
of a practitioner. There may be problems in the hierarchy; there might be very sim-
ple constraints regarding financial or administrative/legal rules. A comprehensive 
approach which does not refer to the importance of such internal constraints is 
therefore not likely to be seriously taken into account.
A practitioner also more often than not may point to a lack of time when being 
asked to coordinate more, to apply more comprehensive approaches, to write more 
analytic reports. He or she may readily acknowledge the potential usefulness of 
such endeavors but may quickly add that this is an academic endeavor rather than 
something that he or she realistically can implement. He/she may also add that, of 
course, such wider ambitions may be useful but do not belong to the job description 
of the practitioner in question.
The moment think-tank experts researchers preach a message rather than seek to 
help the practitioner to do a better job is, therefore, likely to be the time when the 
practitioner stops reading or listening.
In the end, the practitioner may benefit mainly from two types of contributions 
from the outside: (1) providing a frame of reference for organizing incoming infor-
mation; (2) assistance not in terms of actual learning but in how to find information 
quickly by zooming out more widely than in the past. 
To succeed in creating situational awareness in a wider sense, using a helicopter 
perspective, this requires more or less daily efforts on the part of the official. To 
make this possible presence on social media, for instance on Twitter is likely to be 
crucial. 
In the end, arguably, it is only with such a wider situational awareness that the 
official is likely to interact with confidence inside and outside the EU in a proactive 
way on security, willing to take calculated risks in support of EU Global Strategy 
implementation. 
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